THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (DECEMBER 24, 2025)

1.1 The inflection Point of Winter 2025

December 24, 2025, represents a definitive operational and strategic inflection point in the forty-seventh month of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The twenty-four-hour period covered by this assessment was characterized not merely by high-intensity kinetic exchanges but by the crystallization of long-term strategic trends that will define the conflict's trajectory into 2026. The convergence of a massive, complex aerial offensive by the Russian Federation, the political formalization of Ukraine's "20-Point Peace Framework," and the degradation of internal security within the Russian capital itself suggests a war that has metastasized beyond the conventional frontline into a totalized struggle of attrition, diplomacy, and asymmetric destabilization.

The operational tempo on this date was dictated by the Russian command's imperative to fracture Ukraine's energy cohesion before the deep winter freeze, employing a saturation strike package of 131 loitering munitions and cruise missiles. While the Ukrainian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), bolstered by the operational maturity of F-16 platforms, achieved a strategic victory in intercepting the vast majority of cruise missiles, the "leakers" succeeded in isolating distinct energy regions, threatening to fragment the national grid.

Simultaneously, the ground war exhibited a non-linear dynamism. The withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Siversk, a bastion of the Donbas defense since 2022, signals a shift in Ukrainian operational art toward preserving combat power over holding terrain at all costs. This contrasts sharply with the successful tactical counter-offensives in the Kupiansk sector, where Ukrainian units reclaimed settlements lost weeks prior, exposing the brittleness of Russian infantry infiltration tactics when subjected to mechanized counter-pressure.

1.2 The Diplomatic-Military Paradox

A profound paradox defined the strategic landscape of December 24. While kinetic lethality reached new peaks with thermobaric drone warheads and deep strikes on Russian industrial plants, the diplomatic track accelerated with unprecedented specificity. President Zelenskyy's public unveiling of the "20-Point Peace Plan," hammered out in Florida with U.S. intermediaries, introduced concepts previously considered taboo, such as "Free Economic Zones" in occupied territories. This suggests that Kyiv and Washington are preparing the information space for a complex endgame that balances territorial integrity with geoeconomic pragmatism, even as they ramp up the lethality of the war to strengthen their negotiating hand.

2. The Aerial Theater: Saturation, Interception, and Grid Resilience

2.1 The Christmas Eve Strike Package Analysis

The aerial offensive launched by the Russian Federation on the night of December 23-24 was a textbook example of a "complex saturation attack" designed to overwhelm the engagement channels of Western-supplied air defense systems.

Munition Composition and Launch Vectors:

The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) utilized a tiered strike package aimed at exhausting Ukrainian missile stocks before delivering the kinetic blow.

• Decoy and Saturation Layer: The attack began with the launch of 131 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Crucially, this wave included not only the lethal Shahed-136/131 (Geran-2) variants but also "Gerbera" type drones. The Gerbera, a cheaper, lighter foam-constructed drone often lacking a warhead, is deployed specifically to light up Ukrainian radar screens and draw fire from expensive interceptors like NASAMS or IRIS-T, clearing the path for the kinetic wave.

• Kinetic Cruise Missile Wave: Following the drone screen, Tu-95MS strategic bombers and ground-based Iskander launchers fired 35 cruise missiles (Kh-101 and Iskander-K).

• Hypersonic Component: The package included three Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles, targeted likely at high-value command or energy distribution nodes, though reports indicate these failed to reach their targets.

Launch Geometry:

The vectors of attack were calculated to exploit gaps in the radar horizon. Drones were launched from:

• Kursk & Orel (North): Minimizing flight time to Kyiv and energy hubs in Sumy/Chernihiv.

• Primorsko-Akhtarsk (East): Targeting the industrial corridor of Dnipropetrovsk.

• Occupied Crimea (South): Targeting Odesa and the southern port infrastructure.

2.2 The Evolution of Ukrainian IADS: The F-16 Factor

The defensive performance on December 24 provided the most concrete validation to date of the F-16's integration into Ukraine's air defense architecture.

Munition Type	Launched	Intercepted	Interception Rate	Primary Interceptor
UAVs (Shahed/Gerbera)	131	106	81%	Mobile Fire Groups / Gepard / EW
Cruise Missiles (Kh-101/Iskander-K)	35	34	97%	F-16 / Ground Based AD
Aeroballistic (Kinzhal)	3	0 (Missed)	N/A	Electronic Warfare / Technical Failure

Tactical Insight:

Air Force Spokesperson Yurii Ihnat explicitly credited F-16 pilots with the lion's share of the cruise missile interceptions. This marks a shift in doctrine. Previously, defending vast rear areas against subsonic cruise missiles required stationing scarce SAM batteries (Patriot, S-300) near every major city. The F-16s, equipped with look-down/shoot-down radar and AIM-120 AMRAAMs or AIM-9X Sidewinders, act as "roving goalies." They can patrol vectors of approach and intercept missiles far from the target cities, freeing up ground-based systems to focus on ballistic threats (which aircraft cannot intercept) and frontline coverage.

2.3 Critical Infrastructure Impact: The "Energy Island" Strategy

Despite the high interception rates, the "leakers" achieved disproportionate strategic effects. The targeting logic has shifted from generation (power plants) to distribution (substations and transformers).

• Regional Isolation: Strikes caused emergency outages in Chernihiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa.

• Kharkiv Thermal Plant Strike: A specific strike on a thermal power plant (TPP) in the suburbs of Kharkiv killed one civilian and disrupted heat supply to the Rohan and KhTZ districts. The loss of heat in sub-zero temperatures is a form of demographic warfare, intended to trigger displacement waves toward the western regions or Europe.

• Systemic Fragmentation: The "energy island" mode mentioned in reports indicates that the grid's frequency synchronization is breaking down. Russia's goal is to physically sever the high-voltage transmission lines connecting the nuclear-rich western Ukraine (Rivne, Khmelnytskyi NPPs) from the consumption-heavy industrial east, starving the defense industry of power.

3. Ground Operations: The Dynamics of the Donbas and North

3.1 The Northern Front: The Battle for Kupiansk

The operational situation around Kupiansk, a critical railway logistics hub in Kharkiv Oblast, demonstrated the fragility of recent Russian gains.

Tactical Reversal:

Russian forces had previously infiltrated the eastern outskirts of Kupiansk using small infantry groups, capitalizing on fog and bad weather to bypass strongpoints. However, on December 24, Ukrainian forces, spearheaded by the National Guard's "Khartiia" Brigade and the 92nd Assault Brigade, executed a coordinated counter-sweep.

• Settlements Liberated: Kindrashivka and Radkivka.

• Russian Tactical Failure: The Russian "infiltration" tactic, while effective for seizing grey zones, leaves light infantry isolated without armored support. The Ukrainian counter-attack utilized mechanized assets to cut off these forward elements from their logistical tail across the Oskil River.

• Casualty Asymmetry: Reports indicate that a Russian unit operating in this sector lost nearly 150 soldiers in December alone due to this isolation. This confirms that while Russia can project force, it struggles to sustain force in contested urban environments without secure ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

3.2 The Eastern Front: The Fall of Siversk

In stark contrast to the north, the eastern front saw a calculated Ukrainian withdrawal from Siversk.

Terrain and Operational Logic:

Siversk sits in a geographical low point (a "kettle") relative to the surrounding heights. Russian forces, having slowly ground through the flanks over the summer and autumn of 2025, had established fire control over the supply roads leading into the town.

• The Decision to Withdraw: The General Staff cited the need to "preserve the lives of Ukrainian service members". Staying in Siversk under constant artillery crossfire from elevated positions had become operationally inefficient.

• The "Fire Bag": While physically withdrawing, Ukrainian artillery maintains "fire control" over the ruins of Siversk. This turns the town into a trap for occupying Russian forces, who must now garrison a destroyed settlement while being observed and targeted from Ukrainian positions on the western ridges.

• Strategic Implication: The fall of Siversk removes the northern anchor of the Bakhmut-Siversk defensive line. It opens a potential axis of advance for Russian forces toward Lyman to the north or Slovyansk to the west, although the barrier of the Siverskyi Donets river complicates any immediate northward thrust.

3.3 The Southern Front: The Zaphorizhzhia Grind

Russian operations in the south remain characterized by high-cost, low-gain infantry assaults.

• Zarechne and Sviato-Pokrovske: The Russian MoD claimed the capture of these settlements. These are likely "grey zone" hamlets obliterated by artillery. Their capture is less about operational breakthroughs and more about maintaining political momentum for the Kremlin's narrative of "constant advance."

• Hulyaipole Pressure: The reported infiltration attempts into the center of Hulyaipole are more concerning. Hulyaipole has stood as a fortress city preventing a Russian push toward the regional capital of Zaporizhzhia. If the outer defensive belts are being breached, it suggests a degradation of the Ukrainian defensive density in the south, likely due to the diversion of resources to the Donbas and Kursk fronts.

4. The Deep Battle: Asymmetric Warfare and Strategic Strikes

Ukraine's strategy relies heavily on taking the war to Russian territory to degrade the enemy's ability to sustain high-intensity combat operations. On December 24, this campaign achieved significant successes.

4.1 Industrial Attrition: The Tula Strike

The strike on the Efremov Synthetic Rubber Plant in Tula Oblast represents the highest tier of strategic targeting.

• Target Selection: This facility produces polybutadiene rubber and other polymers essential for solid rocket fuel. Unlike oil refineries, which are numerous, the chemical plants capable of producing military-grade solid fuel binders are bottlenecks in the Russian military-industrial complex.

• Impact: A disruption here directly affects the production line of MLRS munitions (Grad, Uragan, Smerch) and tactical ballistic missiles (Iskander). This is a "left of launch" kill chain strategy: destroying the missile before it is even built.

4.2 Naval Blindness: The Yeysk Airbase Strike

The SBU's drone strike on an Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft at Yeysk Airbase was a shaping operation for the naval theater.

• Asset Value: The Il-38N "Novella" is a scarce, modernized platform equipped with advanced sensors for detecting the periscopes and wakes of semi-submersible drones.

• Tactical Purpose: By degrading Russia's aerial surveillance over the Sea of Azov, Ukraine opens corridors for its "Sea Baby" and "Mamura" naval drones to strike Russian logistics shipping and missile carriers in Novorossiysk. This demonstrates a sophisticated cross-domain approach: using aerial drones to blind the enemy so naval drones can kill.

4.3 Internal Destabilization: The Moscow Police Bombing

The explosion in southern Moscow on December 24 marked a severe escalation in rear-area instability.

• Event Details: At 1:30 AM, on Yeletskaya Street, an IED detonated as police officers approached a suspicious individual. Two officers, Lt. Ilya Klimanov (24) and Lt. Maxim Gorbunov (25), were killed instantly along with the suspect.

• Pattern Analysis: This incident occurred just days after and geographically near the car bomb assassination of Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov. The clustering of attacks in southern Moscow suggests an active cell operating with impunity.

• Attribution Dilemma: While Russian authorities reflexively blamed Ukrainian intelligence (GUR), the nature of the attack (a suicide or mishandling detonation during a police check) differs from the precision car bombing of the General. It raises the specter of internal radicalization or a GUR network that is aggressively targeting the internal security apparatus (Rosgvardia/Police) to force the Kremlin to redeploy security forces from the occupied territories back to Moscow.

5. Force Generation: The Industrial Scale of the War

5.1 The Drone War: 3 Million Units

The announcement by Prime Minister Shmyhal that Ukraine will procure 3 million FPV drones in 2025 fundamentally alters the calculus of ground warfare.

• Density: This equates to roughly 8,200 drones available per day. In a 1,000km frontline, that is 8 drones per kilometer, per day.

• Obsolescence of Armor: At this density, traditional mechanized maneuver becomes suicidal without total electronic warfare (EW) supremacy. Any vehicle moving in the open is statistically guaranteed to be attacked. This explains the devolution of Russian tactics to small infantry groups: they are simply harder to spot and "too cheap" to target with scarce heavy weapons, though FPVs are now cheap enough to target individual soldiers.

• Technological Race: The mention of "Gerbera" drones by Russia and "fiber-optic" control drones by Ukraine points to the next phase: EW-immune drones. Fiber-optic drones are unjammable, meaning the "frequency battle" is shifting toward physical kinetic interceptors (shotguns, nets, automated turrets).

5.2 Manpower and Attrition

The Ukrainian General Staff's report of 1.2 million total Russian losses paints a picture of catastrophic attrition. Even if inflated, the sheer necessity for Russia to constantly raise recruitment bonuses and rely on "meat assaults" validates the high casualty rates. However, Russia's ability to regenerate forces through crypto-mobilization and volunteers (400,000 in 2025) suggests that the "breaking point" of Russian manpower is not yet reached, though the quality of troops is visibly degrading (evidenced by the incompetence in the Kupiansk sector).

6. Diplomatic & Political Frameworks

6.1 The "20-Point Plan": A Paradigm Shift

President Zelenskyy's presentation of the 20-Point Peace Framework marks the most significant diplomatic evolution since the Istanbul talks of 2022.

Key Provisions and Analysis:

• Free Economic Zones (FEZ): The proposal to turn occupied areas (specifically mentioned: Enerhodar/ZNPP and potentially parts of Donbas) into demilitarized "Free Economic Zones" is a pragmatic concession. It acknowledges that military liberation of these heavily fortified, ruined urban centers might destroy them completely. An FEZ status allows for a "soft" reintegration or at least a cessation of hostilities without formally ceding sovereignty.

• Referendum Mechanism: The stipulation that any deal must be approved by a national referendum serves as a political shield for Zelenskyy. It prevents domestic rivals from accusing him of betrayal, as the "people" will decide. It also signals to the West that any peace must be democratic, not imposed.

• Security Guarantees: The demand for guarantees mirroring NATO Article 5 is the non-negotiable core. Without this, any ceasefire is viewed merely as a pause for Russian rearmament.

6.2 The Geoeconomics of Sakhalin-1

Vladimir Putin's decree extending the deadline for the sale of ExxonMobil's stake in Sakhalin-1 to 2027 is a subtle signal.

Interpretation: By delaying the "nationalization" or forced sale, Putin is effectively keeping these billions of dollars in assets in a "frozen" state rather than confiscating them. This preserves them as a bargaining chip. It is a signal to Western energy elites that a return to business is possible if political relations normalize. It reveals that the Kremlin is hedging its bets on a post-war economic re-engagement.

7. Humanitarian Impact and Resilience

7.1 Civilian Casualties

The human cost of the December 24 operations was stark.

• Kyiv: A 48-year-old woman died from shrapnel wounds in the Sviatoshynskyi district.

• Vyshhorod: A 76-year-old woman was killed in a private home.

• Kharkiv: One civilian killed in the thermal plant strike.

These deaths, primarily of elderly women or those in residential areas, underscore the indiscriminate effects of intercepting missiles over populated cities and the direct targeting of dual-use infrastructure embedded in urban centers.

7.2 Energy Resilience

The power outages in five oblasts highlight the fragility of life in Ukraine's fourth war winter. The cumulative damage to the grid means there is no "buffer." Every successful Russian strike now translates immediately into cold homes and stopped factories. The resilience of the Ukrainian state now depends as much on its electrical engineers as its soldiers.

8. Strategic Outlook and Forecast

Immediate Term (Next 96 Hours):

Russia will likely continue the saturation strike campaign through the New Year holiday, attempting to break Ukrainian morale. The VKS will try to hunt the F-16s that proved so effective on December 24, likely attempting to target their airbases (Starokostiantyniv, etc.) with ballistic missiles.

Medium Term (Q1 2026):

The battle for the "Fortress Belt" in Donbas will intensify with the fall of Siversk. Russian forces will try to leverage this gain to push toward Slovyansk. However, the mud season and the high density of Ukrainian FPVs (the 3 million stockpile) will likely prevent any rapid operational breakthroughs. The frontline will remain relatively static but extremely lethal.

Long Term (2026):

The diplomatic track initiated by the 20-Point Plan will run parallel to the fighting. The "Free Economic Zone" concept will be the litmus test for compromise. If Russia engages with this idea, a ceasefire is possible. If they reject it in favor of maximalist annexation demands, the war will continue as a grind of industrial attrition well into 2027, supported by the sustainment models of Western aid and the militarized Russian economy.